Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? by Fenner, David E.W.
University of North Florida
UNF Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy
Fall 2010
Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard
Times?
David E.W. Fenner
University of North Florida, dfenner@unf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub
Part of the Esthetics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department
of Philosophy at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UNF
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Digital Projects.
© Fall 2010 All Rights Reserved
Recommended Citation
Fenner, David E.W., "Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times?" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 2.
http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub/2
Reason Papers 32 (Fall 2010): 93-106. Copyright © 2010 
 
Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? 
 
David E. W. Fenner 




 Nick Zangwill has done more than any person recently to resuscitate 
aesthetic formalism.1   I say ―resuscitate‖ because formalism has not been in 
favor for several decades.  Zangwill writes that ―Aesthetic Formalism has 
fallen on hard times.  At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift 
rejection.  At worse it is the object of abuse and derision.‖2 The reasons many 
today believe aesthetic formalism is not viable have been the subject of 
discussion since the pendulum swing away from New Criticism, via the work 
of William Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks, Clement Greenberg, André Levinson, 
and Heinrich Wolfflin.  Most of these reasons have been discussed 
thoroughly, and those that I will review here that have been discussed I will 
spend little time reconsidering.  I believe, though, that there are a few more 
reasons why formalism has fallen on hard times, reasons that have not been 
much discussed, or at least not directly.  They are the subject of this article.
 While the history of aesthetics includes many formalists, some of a 
variety much less modest than the sort with whom Zangwill keeps company, I 
want to use as a baseline definition of formalism Zangwill‘s own.  His 
definition of a formal aesthetic property begins with ―the intuitive idea that 
formal properties are those aesthetic properties that are directly perceivable or 
                                               
1  Within the last few years, Nick Zangwill has revived interest in aesthetic formalism 
in a series of articles.  One, Nick Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ Nous 33, 
no. 4 (1999), pp. 610-29, lays out his positive case for formalism, making use of the 
Kantian model of free and dependent beauty as a departure point.  A second, Nick 
Zangwill, ―In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism,‖ Philosophical Quarterly 50, 
no. 201 (October 2000), pp, 476-93, takes on a major position in opposition to his own, 
that of Kendall Walton as expressed in Kendall Walton, ―Categories of Art,‖ 
Philosophical Review 79 (1970), pp. 334-67.   And a third, Nick Zangwill, ―Defusing 
Anti-Formalist Arguments,‖ British Journal of Aesthetics 40, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 
376-83, offers just what the title suggests.  
2  Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ p. 610. 
Reason Papers Vol. 32 
 
 94 
that are determined by properties that are directly perceivable.‖3  He defines a 
formal property this way: ―Formal properties are entirely determined by 
narrow nonaesthetic properties, whereas non-formal aesthetic properties are 
partly determined by broad nonaesthetic properties.‖4 And concerning narrow 
nonaesthetic properties, he states that ―the word ‗narrow‘ includes both 
sensory properties, non-relational physical properties, and also any 
dispositions to provoke responses that might be thought of to be partly 
constitutive of aesthetic properties.‖5 Zangwill defines himself as a modest 
formalist and, as the immediately preceding quotation suggests, he allows as 
appropriate to the constitution of an object‘s aesthetic character more than a 
less modest formalist (like Clive Bell) would.   
 Since my aim in this article is to shed light on why aesthetic 
formalism has fallen on hard times, I am obliged to keep the discussion fluid 
enough to account for the breadth of formalism as an historical movement in 
aesthetics—or more specifically, three movements in the history of aesthetics: 
(1) formalism of the objective Platonic-Aristotelian variety; (2) formalism 
focused on securing freedom for artworks from social, religious, and moral 
criticism, as we find in the work of Roger Fry, Stuart Hampshire, and 
famously advocated by Oscar Wilde; and (3) formalism focused on 
delineation of what properly counts as an aesthetic property.  This article is 
not a critique of Zangwill‘s formalism.  Indeed, he has made a variety of 
moves, consonant with being a modest formalist, to account for some 
apparently relational properties as relevant to an aesthetic appraisal of objects, 
and this results in rendering his view far less a candidate for rejection than 
earlier views.  Let‘s begin by reviewing some of the more popular reasons for 
the rejection of aesthetic formalism.   
 
2. Reason One: Cognition-Inspiring Aspects of Twentieth-Century 
Modern Works of Art 
 By and large, modern art does not lend itself to formalist critique; for 
many works, there is little of significant value to be found in them—like 
Readymades, Dada, and Pop Art—when viewed from such a perspective.  So 
to the degree to which art theory should follow art, formalism, at least as a 
critical approach, gives way in the twentieth century to what for my purposes 
I call ―contextualism.‖  ―Contextualism‖ is the view that some non-formal 
properties, specifically, properties that provide an appropriate context (or 
                                               
3  Ibid., p. 611. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid. 
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contexts) within which an object or event may be considered, are relevant to 
the constitution of that object‘s or event‘s aesthetic features (and so to its 
aesthetic merits).6 
 There are certainly those who advocate viewing objects such as 
Marcel Duchamp‘s Readymades from a formalist perspective, finding the 
aesthetic value of such works to lie in their formal aesthetic properties and 
crediting Duchamp with seeing in the ordinary aesthetic qualities more 
aesthetic merit than an audience more concerned with the functionality of 
Duchamp‘s ―finds‖ sees.  Unfortunately, this perspective seems at odds with 
Duchamp‘s own artistic processes.  Not to take anything away from his skill 
as a great painter, the challenge for which he has become famous is the 
elevation of ordinary objects to the status of works of art.  If the objects he 
chose had hidden aesthetic depth, his challenge loses its heat.  It becomes 
lukewarm and unworthy of the attention Duchamp (and others like Warhol 
and Rauschenberg) attracted.  To consider a Readymade in line with 
Duchamp‘s artistic processes—but moreover to consider a Readymade in the 
context that affords it the greatest value, the greatest command of attention—
is to view it not formally but rather as inspiration for cognition.   
 
3. Reason Two: Representational Aspects of Works of Art 
 Formalist critical approaches are, at least prima facie, unable to 
account adequately for the value of artworks when that value is tied to the 
representational content or aspects of those works.7  This is a species of a 
larger problem:  formalism does not seem to have a place for properties of a 
relational nature.  If we believe that a case for the aesthetic merits of an object 
(art or otherwise) includes reference to properties that speak to the 
representational relation between that object and some other, formalism does 
not have a place for this.  The same can be said of historical relations.8  If we 
                                               
6  This is discussed in David Fenner, Art in Context (Athens, OH:  Ohio University 
Press, 2008). 
7  Peter Kivy, ―Science and Aesthetic Appreciation,‖ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 
(1991), pp. 180-95. On pp. 192 and 193, Kivy writes that ―the beauty of a scientific 
theory, like the overall artistic success of a realistic painting, is a function also of its 
representational success, which is to say, its truth. . . . Once formalism is given up, the 
claim that, in theoretical sciences, the beautiful can never prevail over the true loses all 
appeal, if not all sense, for, of course, there never is a contest between beauty and truth 
in theoretical science, understood as the attempt to represent nature.  It cannot 
represent nature beautifully, in the fullest sense, without representing it truthfully.‖ 
8 I include with historical relations ―genetic‖ aspects of a work, that is, aspects 
connected to the artist and the context of her creation of the work.   
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believe that the historical context of a work is relevant to a case for the 
aesthetic merit of that work, and aesthetic merit is evidenced on the presence 
of aesthetic properties, then one might claim that the aesthetic properties 
―possessed‖ by the object in question transcend those ―directly perceivable or 
that are determined by properties that are directly perceivable.‖9 
 
4. Reason Three: Expressive Aspects of Works of Art 
 It is unclear that aesthetic formalism will adequately capture 
properties that are expressive in nature.  Zangwill makes provision for this, 
but for other formalists, this problem is the same sort possessed by 
representational and historical considerations. 
 The point regarding the rejection of formalism on the grounds that it 
does not capture expressive properties might be broadened.  Some artists in 
creating their works may well mean to express perspectives on particular 
social issues, religious issues, or issues having to do with ethnicity, race, and 
gender.  It is likely that objects viewed with these perspectives in mind, when 
these perspectives were meant to be expressed by artists through their works, 
will result in richer or at least deeper experiences for audience members.  On 
many occasions, though, in the absence of knowing an artist‘s intentions (or 
sometimes in spite of knowing them), an audience member may inform her 
viewing act with a social-, religious-, ethnic-, or gender-oriented, etc. 
perspective, and the result may be a richer and/or deeper experience.  My 
point is that if we limit expressive properties only to those actually (and 
consciously) expressed by the artist, then we may need another category here, 
one for audience perspectives focused on properties of artworks that are much 
like artist-intended expressions.   
 
5. Reason Four:  Aesthetic Properties and Critical Practice 
 The number one concern of today‘s aesthetic formalist is to advance 
an argument that would delineate in tight and enduring ways what counts as 
an aesthetic property and what does not.  Zangwill writes: 
 
I assume as a fundamental principle that aesthetic properties 
are determined by nonaesthetic properties. . . . Once we 
admit this thesis, there is then an issue about which 
nonaesthetic properties determine aesthetic properties. . . . 
                                               
9  Zangwill addresses historical relations in ―In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic 
Formalism,‖ and so this reason for rejecting aesthetic formalism may only apply to his 
predecessors and not to him. 
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Which nonaesthetic properties are aesthetically ‗relevant‘?  
This is where the issue of formalism should be located.10 
 
I suggest that two motivations are behind this central concern: (1) the 
formalist simply wants to capture what it is we essentially mean to talk about 
when talking about the aesthetic character of an object, and (2) the formalist 
wants to do this in part so that conversations about the aesthetic merits of 
works of art are both meaningful and do not degenerate into individualistic 
relativism.  The latter is predicated on the former.  If I can say what counts as 
an aesthetic property, and can then use my observation ―that such-and-such a 
work of art has such-and-such an aesthetic property‖ as evidence for my claim 
that this work is aesthetically good, then conversations about aesthetic merit 
can be productive.  If I cannot even cite what counts as an aesthetic property 
of a particular work of art, then there is no conversation—at least no 
productive one—to be had.  When I offer my take on a work of art, I mean to 
recommend my take as the right one.  If my companion does not agree with 
me, I would like the opportunity to try to persuade my companion that I am 
right.  To do this, I want to offer a case based on evidence, but if there is no 
way to say in an authoritative (or at least commonly agreed-upon) way what 
counts as evidence—that is, what counts as an actual aesthetic property of the 
object under consideration—then I do not get the opportunity I want.  
Aesthetic formalism offers me a clean way to establish what counts as the 
evidence that I can cite in making my case.   
 This characterization of how we use the citation of aesthetic 
properties was perhaps best articulated and defended by Monroe Beardsley: 
 
The alternative that remains is to say that a distinguishing 
feature of A-qualities [aesthetic qualities] is their intimate 
connection with normative critical judgments—or, more 
explicitly (though still tentatively and roughly), that an A-
quality of an object is an aesthetically valuable quality of 
that object.  On this proposal, what guides our linguistic 
intuition in classifying a given quality as an A-quality is the 
implicit recognition that it could be cited in a reason 
supporting a judgment (affirmative or negative) of aesthetic 
value.11 
 
                                               
10  Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ p. 610. 
11  Monroe C. Beardsley, ―What Is an Aesthetic Quality?‖ Theoria 39 (1973), p. 61.  
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Alan Goldman says that this connection with aesthetic value places aesthetic 
properties in line with their most popular linguistic use as a justification for a 
particular broad aesthetic-evaluative claim about an object or event.  He 
writes:  
 
Aesthetic properties are those which contribute to the 
aesthetic values of artworks (or, in some cases, to the 
aesthetic values of natural objects of scenes). . . .  We might 
conclude that works of art are objects created and perceived 
for their aesthetic values, and that aesthetic properties are 
those which contribute to such values.12 
 
In order to complete Beardsley‘s account, we next must look at what he 
believes to be of aesthetic value: 
 
―X has greater aesthetic value than Y‖ means ―X has the 
capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of greater 
magnitude (such an experience having more value) than that 
produced by Y.‖  Since this definition defines ―aesthetic 
value‖ in terms of consequences, an object‘s utility or 
instrumentality to a certain sort of experience, I shall call it 
an Instrumentalist definition of ―aesthetic value.‖13 
 
Beardsley explains ―greater magnitude‖ this way: 
 
First, an aesthetic experience is one in which attention is 
firmly fixed upon heterogeneous but interrelated 
components of a phenomenally objective field—visual or 
auditory patterns, or the characters and events in literature. . 
. . Second, it is an experience of some intensity. . . . But this 
discussion already anticipates the two other features of 
aesthetic experience, which may both be subsumed under 
unity.  For, third, it is an experience that hangs together, or 
is coherent, to an unusually high degree.  Fourth, it is an 
experience that is unusually complete in itself. . . . 
[B]ecause of the highly concentrated, or localized, attention 
                                               
12  Alan H. Goldman, ―Properties, Aesthetic,‖ in A Companion to Aesthetics, ed. David 
Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995).  See also Alan H. Goldman, ―Aesthetic 
Qualities and Aesthetic Value,‖ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), pp. 23-37. 
13  Beardsley, Aesthetics, p. 531. 
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characteristic of aesthetic experience, it tends to mark itself 
out from the general stream of experience, and stand in 
memory as a single experience. . . . One aesthetic 
experience may differ from another in any or all of three 
connected but independent respects. . . . I propose to say 
that one aesthetic experience has a greater magnitude—that 
is, it is more of an aesthetic experience—than another; and 
that its magnitude is a function of at least these three 
variables.14   
 
 I mentioned above that the formalist may be motivated both by a 
concern for explicating aesthetic character and by using that explication as 
evidence for aesthetic value claims.  It seems to me that Beardsley‘s 
articulation of what counts as an aesthetic property speaks directly to these 
matters.  Beardsley‘s entré to the topic is critical aesthetic practice, actual 
lived critical aesthetic practice.  Although Frank Sibley taught us that this is a 
one-way dynamic,15 Beardsley reminds us that when we make evaluative 
judgments about aesthetic objects, we evidence these judgments by citing 
aesthetic properties that the object possesses.  Current accounts now involve 
the subject—Sibley, Beardsley, and probably most twentieth- and twenty-
first-century aestheticians agree with this—but essentially the evidencing of 
our aesthetic evaluations is borne by the citation of the object‘s aesthetic 
properties.  And these, of course, are evidenced by the object‘s possession of 
certain nonaesthetic (base) properties.   
 What is at issue concerns the size of the set of appropriate and 
relevant nonaesthetic properties.  The formalist limits her set to those 
dependent directly and exclusively on the object‘s narrow nonaesthetic 
properties.  But it strikes me that if we take seriously the Beardsleyan project 
of delineating what counts as an aesthetic property on the basis of its use in 
actual critical practice, we have to confront two things.  First, we take into 
account the inductive, particularist nature inherent in the Beardsleyan 
approach.  And, second, by following the approach, we recognize that typical 
critical aesthetic practice today—New Yorker criticism, as an example16—
does not follow a formalist approach.   
                                               
14  Ibid., pp. 527-29. 
15 Frank Sibley, ―Aesthetic Concepts,‖ Philosophical Review 68 (1959), pp. 421-50. 
 
16  That is, New Yorker criticism today.  In the past, the New Yorker certainly had its 
share of formalist critics.  My favorite example is Arlene Croce, the dance critic.   
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 When it comes to his focus on aesthetic experience and his 
discussion of its nature, it is easy to see Beardsley‘s Deweyan roots.  
Aesthetic experience is a sort of bedrock in Beardsley‘s aesthetics, and his 
discussion of it has a marked psychological tone.  Determining the character 
of aesthetic experience according to its psychological character implies that 
the project must be particularist and inductivist (and the results contingent and 
open to future empirical influence).  This same feature is present in 
Beardsley‘s delineation of aesthetic properties.  They are based on actual 
critical practice, and as such, they cannot be, through a priori means, 
delineated in any way that will result in a closed set of all and only aesthetic 
properties.   
 This is further complicated, for the formalist, by taking stock of 
actual critical practice.  The vast majority of critics writing today include in 
their aesthetic evaluations of objects and events ascription to the objects of 
aesthetic properties that go beyond those based on narrow nonaesthetic 
properties.  This seems necessarily the case when we are talking about so 
many of the objects of twentieth-century art that are virtually unrecognizable 
as art without involving external considerations, including objects from 
Duchamp, Warhol, Rauschenberg, and many others.  This may drive the 
aesthetic formalist to say that the art objects (relevant to this discussion) 
created by these artists do not have marked aesthetic characters, and that a 
distinction between art objects and aesthetic objects is now required (and so, 
to boot, Beardsley‘s subsumption of the former under the latter will not work 
anymore).  Even granting this distinction to the formalist, the plain typical 
reality is that even when focused on what we intuitively see as aesthetic 
objects, and when focused on what we intuitively take to be the aesthetic 
aspects of these works, critics will include in the evidence for their 
evaluations citation of nonaesthetic properties as relevant that are not 
exclusively narrow.  Only by having a preconceived view of aesthetic 
properties can we begin a priori to parse out the properties reported in 
aesthetic experiences into aesthetic ones and nonaesthetic ones.  Beardsley‘s 
project, on the other hand, is particularist: aesthetic properties are those that 
―could be cited in a reason supporting a judgment . . . of aesthetic value.‖17  
What reasons may be offered, what properties cited, may well be expected to 
differ, subject to subject, experience to experience, object to object, critic to 
critic.   
 Zangwill says that ―without ‗a sense of form and color and a 
knowledge of three-dimensional space‘ we cannot appreciate a work of visual 
art,‖ which he translates as ―without an appreciation of the aesthetic properties 
determined by two-dimensional design and the representation of three-
                                               
17 Beardsley, ―What Is an Aesthetic Quality?‖ p. 61. 
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dimensional shapes, we cannot appreciate a work of visual art.‖  Just before 
this, though, he writes of this claim: ―This, I maintain, is almost always 
true!‖18  I think the word ―almost‖ there is crucial; it rightly allows for the 
possibility of differences in particular experiences.  I agree with Zangwill‘s 
general point about the centrality of turning first to formal aesthetic properties 
in recounting aesthetic experiences and in advancing aesthetic claims, but this 
seems a modest observation.  What Zangwill wants to do, it seems to me, is to 
establish two things: (1) the indispensability, the necessity, of a formal 
aesthetic description of every aesthetic object (for which he does not want to 
invoke ―tactical retreat‖), and (2) the centrality of such a description to every 
aesthetic account, be it descriptive or evaluative of an experience.  Let me 
repeat a quotation from above:   
 
I assume as a fundamental principle that aesthetic properties 
are determined by nonaesthetic properties. . . . Once we 
admit this thesis, there is then an issue about which 
nonaesthetic properties determine aesthetic properties. . . . 
Which nonaesthetic properties are aesthetically ‗relevant‘?  
This is where the issue of formalism should be located.19 
 
If the aesthetic relevancy of nonaesthetic properties is the core issue, and if, 
following Beardsley and Goldman, we have aesthetic relevancy turn on the 
reasonableness of citing that nonaesthetic property as evidence for an 
aesthetic claim, then there is no way to circumscribe in any stable way exactly 
and precisely what nonaesthetic properties will aesthetically be relevant and 
which will not.  Barring this, the two claims I mentioned directly above 
cannot be established.  The best we can say is ―it all depends on the subject‘s 
description of her experience, or on what she chooses to use as reasons for her 
judgment.‖  This is not a particularly satisfying conclusion, but it seems 
inescapable.   
 In order for aesthetic evaluation to be normative, it must rely on the 
evidencing of claims, and this evidencing must go all the way down.  But 
where ―all the way down‖ ends up is not clear.  The formalist believes it ends 
in narrow nonaesthetic properties, but if we use today‘s typical critical 
practice to determine where we end up ―all the way down,‖ the preponderance 
of evidence suggests that we do not have perfect reason to settle just on those 
narrow properties. 
 
                                               
18  Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ p. 618. 
19  Ibid., p. 610. 
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6. Reason Five:  Aesthetic Character and the Problem of Taste 
 Sibley famously argues that reductions of evaluative aesthetic claims 
will never result in arrangements of objective properties.20  He discusses the 
importance of engaging ―taste‖ in ascribing to objects aesthetic properties.  To 
judge aesthetic objects requires the involvement of a subjective context,21 the 
engagement of a set of skills on the part of the audience member. So we can 
ask:  If all aesthetic evaluative activity requires taste, and the exercise of taste 
is ―subjectively additive‖ to the object or event under consideration, then isn‘t 
aesthetic judgment in its very nature an anti-formalist matter?  (By 
―subjectively additive,‖ I mean that the subject imports something substantive 
to the establishment of the presence of a particular aesthetic property, 
something that is not present without the subject‘s contribution.)  If aesthetic 
evaluation, understood after the subjective turn of the eighteenth century and 
after Sible, essentially involves the subject bringing to her evaluation of an 
object her ―taste,‖ a thing essentially external to the object, then does this not 
mean that any formalism is incoherent on the grounds that no aesthetic 
evaluation can be performed in the absence of the incursion of the external set 
of skills we call the subject‘s taste?  If this were the case, then formalism 
should have entirely passed away with the arrival of Sibley‘s work.  If 
formalism survives the notion that all aesthetic evaluation requires the 
inclusion of taste, then what taste must do is simply to actualize an objective 
potential; what it does not do, if formalism is coherent, is ―additively‖ to 
include subjective contributions, aspects of the subject essentially external to 
what is given in the art object or event.   
 But there‘s more to be said.  David Hume‘s attempt, some people 
believe, to balance the subjectivity and incorrigibility of taste with a realist 
account of aesthetic judgment fails.22  It fails on the probability that two 
equally well-disposed aesthetic judges might ultimately disagree about the 
merits of a given object.  This is usually chalked up to a difference in taste.  
Here we are not talking about ―good‖ versus ―bad‖ taste, nor are we talking 
about the subjective faculty that allows us to recognize or actualize the 
                                               
20  Frank Sibley, ―Aesthetic Concepts,‖ Philosophical Review 68 (1959), pp. 421-50.  
21  It is important to note that I use the terms ―subjective‖ and ―objective‖ to denote 
locations of states or properties, not to denote either the state of reality/existence of 
those states/properties or whether claims about their reality/existence are true or false.  
These are separate matters and must be understood as separate to make sense of my 
claims.  ―Subjective‖ does not mean ―individually relative‖ or ―a matter of personal 
taste.‖   
22 David Hume, ―Of the Standard of Taste,‖ in Four Dissertations (1757), accessed 
online at: http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r15.html. 
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presence of aesthetic properties as in the theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
and in a slightly different way Sibley.  We are instead talking about  personal 
taste:  some people like Mozart, some like John Lennon.  Some people like 
David Lynch, some like David Lean.  Some people like Kandinsky, some like 
Sargent.  If it is an irreducible fact about human aesthetic sensibility that 
tastes vary, then this constitutes a very present and very real context through 
which we view aesthetic objects.   
 Goldman believes that aesthetic realism does not survive the 
inescapable fact of individual taste.  He writes: 
 
Another and far more obvious reason for the absence of 
principles with which to support aesthetic evaluation lies in 
irreconcilable differences in taste.  It is an old cliché that 
what appeals to one person in art will not appeal to another.  
But if true, this in itself might block principles that would 
link nonevaluative to evaluative properties of works . . . .23 
 
[T]he crucial point once more is that even fully developed 
and informed tastes can differ across ideal critics.24 
 
Differences in taste even among ideal critics show that 
objective properties do not only count in one direction 
(Sibley thought they do).  Even the same lines in the same 
work do not count only positively toward gracefulness; they 
may count negatively for other critics.25 
 
[W]e must relativize aesthetic judgments to ideal (but still 
human) critics who share tastes.26 
 
 Sibley‘s taste is subjective but not additive, or at least it can be 
conceived in a way that the exercise of taste as a means of properly citing the 
aesthetic properties of an object does not involve the addition of something 
external, that the taste-function as Sibley describes it merely actualizes an 
objective potential.  This is also consistent with what Beardsley and Hume 
                                               
23 Alan H. Goldman, Aesthetic Value (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 13. 
24  Ibid., p. 42. 
25 Ibid., p. 138. 
26 Ibid., p. 176. 
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say, but the sort of taste that Goldman talks about is indeed additive.  It is 
additive in the sense that the subject contributes to the strength and to the 
relevancy of what nonaesthetic properties are focal in her description of the 
aesthetic properties of the object under consideration.  Since the subject‘s 
taste (―taste‖ in the Goldmanian sense) changes the aesthetic evaluation of the 
object, it not only results, as Goldman says, in a rejection of aesthetic realism, 
it also results in a rejection of formalism.   
 Let me offer an example.  I pepper my lectures in aesthetics with 
many examples from twentieth-century art.  I talk about the New York School 
and about its importance to modern art, to American art, and to the 
development of art itself.  One cannot talk about the New York School 
without talking about Jackson Pollock, especially his late, flat, purely abstract 
work.  I do not hesitate to say how important this work is, but I never miss an 
opportunity to follow this up by talking about my aesthetic distaste (dis-taste) 
of Pollock‘s work from this period.  I say that if I were at the Museum of 
Modern Art with a colleague, and that colleague were ―pro-Pollock,‖ she 
might well talk in aesthetically positive terms about the abstraction, the 
absence of focal points, the extreme balance we get in the drip paintings, the 
complexity, the order, the uniformity, and so forth.  My reaction is to 
acknowledge all of these things and then say that these are exactly the 
properties one looked for in 1960s kitchen-counter laminates.  The point of 
my silly example is to show that the aesthetic properties that my colleague 
cites as supportive of her case of the aesthetic merit of the work rest on 
nonaesthetic (base) properties that I will use in my negative case about the 
work.  Where she sees a nonaesthetic property that grounds the correct 
identification of a positive aesthetic property, say order, I will see that same 
nonaesthetic property grounding the correct identification of a negative 
aesthetic property, say being boring.  And perhaps more to the point, there are 
sure to be nonaesthetic properties that my colleague cites as important to her 
aesthetic case for the merits of the work, nonaesthetic properties that I find 
entirely irrelevant, and vice versa.   
 This is not a new point, and Goldman describes it more eloquently 
than I do.  Scenarios like this clearly support the point that taste in the way 
that Goldman uses the word contributes an external context to the critical 
evaluation of (probably most) aesthetic objects, and an external context that 
bears directly on what counts as an aesthetic property and what does not, 
which nonaesthetic properties are relevant to the aesthetic character of an 
object, and which are not.   
 Please note that I have not left the formalist playing field.  In my 
colleague‘s and my considerations of the Pollock piece, our assessments have 
only to do with the formal properties of, and formal relations within, the work.  
But as our divergent tastes bring certain nonaesthetic properties to the fore 
and push away others as irrelevant, we end up, while attending only to the 
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formal properties of the work, with radically different descriptions of the 
object‘s aesthetic properties.  Formalism, because of personal taste, cannot 
deliver a stable account of an object‘s aesthetic properties, and so it cannot 
deliver a stable account of the aesthetic character of objects and events.   
 The formalist who may say that the above example not only does not 
show what I mean it to show but actually shows the reverse—insofar as my 
colleague and I only discourse about the formal properties of the Pollock 
work, and so thereby support the formalist‘s assertion that the aesthetic 
character of the work lies principally, perhaps exclusively, in its formal 
properties—misses the point I mean to make.  First, it is a choice that I 
confine the example to discussion of merely the object‘s formal qualities, a 
choice I make for the sake of showing that a strictly formalist analysis will not 
capture in stable and enduring terms the aesthetic character of the work in a 
nonrelativist way.  Second, were I offering a true account of my take on the 
aesthetic character of the work, I would also certainly count as an aesthetic 
property the absence of representational qualities.  My colleague will use the 
absence of representational qualities as a reason to praise the work (perhaps 
moving into art-historical contextual considerations next), and I will use the 
absence of such qualities to criticize the work (as lacking anything like an  
engaging focus).  Third, any serious critic hearing us discourse will think us 
uninformed; to discuss a mature Pollock work is almost certainly to include its 
art-historical context and significance, and I would wager that most critics 
would hold that, in the case of Pollock, a firm distinction between the 
aesthetic properties of the work and the (nonaesthetic) artistic features of the 
work is a mistake.  The significance and importance of the formal properties 
of a mature Pollock turn on their art-historical context.  Flatness is important, 
but it can only be seen as important contextually. 
 
7. Reason Six: The Importation of the Subject 
 The last reason I want to offer in answering the question, ―Why has 
formalism fallen on hard times?‖ has to do with the history of aesthetic 
theory.  I believe that the context of the historical development of formalist 
theories leads us to where we are today, that it explains why formalists (in 
both aesthetic theory and art theory) are in short supply now.  Aesthetic 
formalism begins with Aristotle, continues through Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas, and on down to Shaftesbury.  These formalists were objectivists and 
their theories offer formulas for the connection between the ascription of 
beauty and the presence of certain nonaesthetic base properties possessed by 
the object cited as beautiful.  Formalism continues with Francis Hutcheson, 
Joseph Addison, and Immanuel Kant; these formalists adopted ontologies that 
were relational or mixed objective and subjective elements.  Formalists of the 
twentieth century generally are not up front with their ontological 
commitments; they include Roger Fry, G. E. Moore, Clive Bell, Stuart 
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Hampshire, Melvin Rader, Eduard Hanslick, and José Ortega y Gassett.  The 
formalism that was meant, for pre-seventeenth-century theorists, to underwrite 
aesthetic realism ultimately does not survive the subjective turn of the 
eighteenth century.  Certainly, it survives in the short term, but as the 
subjective turn of the eighteenth century is what leads to the subjectivism in 
Sibley‘s account of the necessity of the exercise of taste in aesthetic property 
ascription, and as Hume and Sibley together lead to positions like Goldman‘s 
about the ―contextually additive‖ nature of the exercise of personal or 
individual taste in determining the relevancy and strength of nonaesthetic 
properties in aesthetic characterizations of objects and events, I think it is fair 
to say that once objectivism goes, so too does the metaphysical ground that 
formalism requires to survive and to undergird realist agendas.   
 Twentieth-century formalists do not engage in much ontological 
discussion.  Certainly, part of this has to do with different motivations from 
those before the eighteenth century.  Twentieth-century formalists—
Aestheticists and New Critics—had other fish to fry; they needed to protect 
the aesthetic quality of their arts from domination by external considerations 
focused on morality, politics, and the like.  However, I think that part of the 
reason that twentieth-century formalists begin to give up talking about their 
ontological bases is because to do so is to have to walk a tightrope: to be 
subjectivist—as Kant and Beardsley are—but at the same time to be 
absolutists about aesthetic evaluation (and realists about the presence of the 
aesthetic properties that undergird evaluative claims).  It was the eighteenth 
century that set the stage for the abandonment of formalism we see today.  
Kant may have been the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries‘ formalists‘ best 
friend, but I think that it was the subjective ontology that he employed that 
explains in large measure why formalists today are in short supply.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
